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NARCISSISM, MIMESIS AND PSYCHOSIS: 
THE FREUD-JUNG DEBATE REVISITED1
PHILIPPE VAN HAUTE
1. Introduction
Do you regard sexuality as the mother of all feelings? Isn’t sexuality for you merely one 
component of the personality (albeit the most important), and isn’t the sexual complex 
therefore the most important and most frequent component in the clinical picture of hysteria? 
Are there not hysterical symptoms which, though co-determined by the sexual complex, are 
predominantly conditioned by a sublimation or by a non-sexual complex (profession, job, 
etc.)? (Letter 39J)2'
Jung's cautious question to Freud in a certain sense reformulates the stake 
of their longstanding dialogue such as it takes shape in exemplary manner in 
their correspondence: how sexual is the libido? Can you sustain your 
(Freud’s) constantly reaffirmed commitment to the sexual character of the 
libido? Nevertheless, in contrast with what the passage just cited might lead 
one to suspect, the stake of the discussions between Freud and Jung was not 
the sexual aetiology of the neuroses so much as that of the psychoses. In this 
connection, Jung was for Freud a privileged if not dreamed-of discussion 
partner. Jung not only provided the clinical experience that Freud lacked in 
the field of the psychoses, but at the same time brought him and psycho­
analysis into contact with and made them acceptable to, the official German 
psychiatry of the day. Jung was a close collaborator with Bleuler at the 
Burgholzi hospital in Zurich. With Jung’s help, Freud hoped to accomplish 
two things at once: on the one hand, he wanted to extend his theory of 
neurosis into the domain of the psychoses, and on the other he sought the 
recognition of the most renowned representatives of the psychiatry of the 
day. The psychiatric problem p a r  excellence, the psychoses, was to be 
carefully reworked from out of the psychoanalytic metapsychology so that, 
conversely, psychoanalysis could provide a theoretical framework for the 
further development of psychiatry. The stake of die debate between Jung and 
Freud was in this sense from the beginning political as well as theoretical.
Very schematically, one could say that Freud4 tries to understand 
psychosis from out of a withdrawal of libidinal -  and one should remember 
here that Freud is talking of a libido sexualis -  investment from objects of 
the outside world. Whereas in neurosis the disinvestment of, for example, 
forbidden objects of the outside world leads to reinvestment of these objects 
in the world of fantasy (introversion), the psychotic seems to have severed 
his ties with reality entirely. According to Freud, reinvestment of outer 
reality happens in psychosis only in a secondary manner and must be 
understood as an effort at healing. Psychotic delusion is, in other words,
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nothing but an attempt in extremis to reinstate investment from the outside 
world.
But what is the fate of the libido that is withdrawn from the outer world in 
the first place? Here, says Freud, it is megalomania that points the way. The 
libidinous energy first attached to an external object is now invested in the 
ego. By analogy with sexual overestimation of the object of love -  the object 
of love is idealized and all sorts of perfections that escape a ‘neutral’ 
bystander are attributed to it -  Freud understands the inflation of the ego in 
megalomania as a consequence of a libidinous investment of the ego. The 
ego, as it were, takes itself as exclusive libidinous object. Here, the critique 
of many unsympathetic commentators is in fact obvious: one can indeed 
accept that libidinous investment of the ego leads to a single, perhaps 
limitless, overestimation of oneself, but why should we necessarily refer to 
this investment as ‘sexual’? After all, does not Freud himself say that the 
investment of libido in the ‘ego’ is attended by a ‘desexualisation’?5 And
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when the libido that is directed on the ego in this manner is not ‘really’ 
sexual, but is still libido, should we not rather understand it according to the 
example of Jung, as an a-specific ‘psychical interest’?
It is precisely in order to reply to this and to similar objections that Freud
introduced the concept of narcissism into his metapsychology.6 In
accordance with his general model of pathology in which every psychical
disorder implies a regression to an earlier, in itself non-pathological
(infantile) stage of libido development, Freud considers the narcissism of the
psychotic a regressive repetition of an infantile narcissism that he further
deems responsible for the veiy constitution of the ego. With the exception of
his “Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895), Freud paid relatively little
attention to the status of the ego until around the year 1910 -  that is, until
his meeting with Jung and with psychosis. From the year 1910 until around
1914 -  that is, throughout the correspondence with Jung and in the texts that
mark its evolution7 -  Freud works out the idea that the ego itself must be
understood as a libidinous -  and thus a ‘sexual’ -  construct. The ego is not
given from the beginning, but must be developed. This is brought about as
the different partial (sexual) drives that until then found satisfaction in auto-
erotic and diffuse manner are now unified and take the body as totality for
their object. The ego, Freud says, emerges as an effect of a new psychic
action (“eine neue psychische Aktion”) in which the body as a whole is taken
as an object of love.8 In this way, narcissism emerges as a stage in which the
outer world has no psychical meaning for the infant. Psychosis must be
understood as a regressive return to the stage in which ‘the ego was its own 
ideal’.
This rudimentary evocation of Freud’s theory of primary narcissism and of 
the theoretical-political context in which it was worked out can already make
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it sufficiently clear why this theory may have enjoyed so much attention in 
philosophical circles. The stake of the debate is indeed considerable from a 
philosophical point of view: it concerns not only the essential nature of 
human desire, but also the origin of the ego and of subjectivity itself.
In the past twenty years, there has been much concern in philosophy over 
what could be called the ‘mimetic status of desire and of subjectivity’, I will 
not take up that discussion at any length here, but it is interesting to take note 
of the number of philosophers (including M. Borch-Jacobsen, Ph. Lacoue- 
Labarthe and J.-L. Nancy, R. Girard) and psychoanalysts (such as F. 
Roustang) who have entered into the discussion on the mimetic character of 
desire and subjectivity with explicit reference to Freud, Freud’s theory of 
narcissism and his correspondence with Jung." Moreover, they do so in a 
manner that in a certain sense seems to side with Jung against Freud. Freud 
reproaches Jung for remaining unreceptive to what is nonetheless a central 
point for psychoanalytic metapsychology -  namely, the sexual character of 
the libido. The philosophers just mentioned turn this reproach back on itself: 
had you (Freud) only listened a little better to Jung, then you would have 
seen what you could or would not see -  and what Jung was on the verge of 
seeing -  that desire (as well as subjectivity) must be understood in terms of 
or as mimesis, and that it therefore can not be called intrinsically sexual.
Thus, after an interval of some seventy years, the debate between Freud 
and Jung is taken up anew. During the course of those years, the stake of that 
debate remains, at bottom, virtually unchanged. For the theoreticians of 
mimesis not only dispute the intrinsic sexual character of the libido but also 
immediately pretend -  whether explicitly or not -  to lay bare a psychotic 
core of subjectivity. If subjectivity has a mimetic character, then psychosis is 
among its intrinsic possibilities. This is reason enough to pursue exactly 
what these pretenses entail and if -  against Freud and with Jung -  they can 
be sustained. In what follows, I do not attempt to formulate a conclusive 
solution for this discussion, but instead will try to sketch its central lines. I 
will try to show that both Jung and the theoreticians of mimesis failed to see 
the stake of Freud’s linking up in an inextricable way sexuality and libido. 
We will try to reveal the fundamental misunderstandings that structure, as it 
were, the discussion between them. The question then is not so much who is 
right and who is wrong, but rather what the debate should be about. But 
before taking up this problem, in more detail let us first say a word at the 
mimetic theory of desire.
2, The Mimetic Structure o f Desire
The intrinsic relation between desire and mimesis was brought to light in 
a very powerful way by the French philosopher and anthropologist René 
Girard.10 Desire, Girard argues, in a certain sense has no object. Or, better,
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desire has no object which has not been rendered desirable by some mediator 
-  a master, books, style, culture. Consequently, there is no essential relation 
between desire and its object: desire for a specific object is an induced 
desire. It is secondary with respect to imitation -  that is to say, mimesis -  of 
the desire of the other. Desire is as it were mobilized by a model to which it 
conforms itself or with which it identifies. Mimesis informs desire, it 
awakens it and determines the path it takes."
If desire is thus intrinsically mimetic, then it is also essentially confiictual: 
“I want what my brother, my model wants -  in and at his/her place.” The 
model that informs desire for structural reasons also proves to be an obstacle: 
since desire for the object is in its very essence desire for the mediator, it will 
also inevitably be confronted with the fact that this mediator also desires the 
object or, worse even, already possesses it. In his relation to his model the 
subject experiences a lacerating feeling that emerges out of the combination 
of two opposites : the unconditional respect (after all, s/he is my model) and 
unrelenting resentment. This, Girard says, is precisely what we commonly 
call ‘hatred’ .12 This hatred is not only directed towards the model-obstacle, 
but also, if not in the first place, against oneself because of the admiration 
that is hidden behind it. In order not to have to admit this admiration the 
other is reduced to a mere obstacle. Thus the 'disciple’ does not declare 
himself a faithful follower. Rather s/he will deny all mediation between 
him/her and his/her model by stressing the originality of his/her own desire 
and in doing so reversing the logical and chronological order of the desires 
that are involved. But perhaps even more important is the following: if desire 
is mimetic then by definition it has no specific -  e.g., sexual -  object. Desire, 
according to Girard, is indeed not awakened by an object, but through 
mimetic assimilation of or through a model. The object is as a consequence 
determined in function of this model. It is desired not in itself, but because it 
belongs first to the model -  and there is nothing to guarantee that this model 
will be a ‘sexual’ one in whatever sense of the word.13
Ultimately, the mimetic model of desire implies that desire is not 
primarily directed to obtaining an object -  sexual or otherwise. Desire wants 
in the first place not to ‘have’ something, but to ‘be’ something: it wants to 
be ‘in and at the place of the other’. To the degree that desire must be 
conceived in terms of mimesis, before all else it wants to be like the other. In 
this sense, desire is directed to the realization of a subjective identity, and it 
is from this that the desire for an object is derived.
If I in the first place and ‘before all else’ -  that is, even before T  have 
reached any definable identity -  want to be in and at the place of the other, 
then it is not sexuality that we should attempt to recover from our phantasms, 
dreams and symptoms, but, for example, jealousy, rivalry or ambition. Is it 
not to this dimension that Jung sought to draw attention when he asked Freud
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whether some symptoms might not be burdened by certain non-sexual 
components? Indeed, as we saw, Jung referred between quotation marks to 
one’s profession, which in this context makes it difficult not to think of 
professional rivalry. And elsewhere Jung stresses that jealousy should not be 
understood exclusively in ‘sexual’ terms.14
In any case, Jung rejects Freud’s theory of an essentially sexual libido. In 
the second part of his “Transformations and Symbols of the Libido” (1911- 
1912) -  in a move which sealed the break with Freud -  he identifies the 
libido with “a concept of intentionality in general.” Jung adds that: “We 
would be better advised, therefore, when speaking of the libido, to 
understand it as an energy-value which is able to communicate itself to any 
field of activity whatsoever, be it power, hunger, hatred, sexuality or 
religion, without ever being itself a specific instinct”.15 In this connection, 
Jung cites Schopenhauer: “The Will as a thing-in-itself is quite different 
from its phenomenal manifestation, and entirely free from all forms of 
phenomenality, which it assumes only when it becomes manifest, and which 
therefore affect its objectivity only, and are foreign to the Will itself’.16 Must 
we not now say the same of desire as mimesis? Must we not also -  indeed, 
mutatis mutandis -  understand mimesis by analogy with Jung’s concept of 
libido as an aspecific dynamic that can express itself in one or another 
domain without being restricted to any single one of them? And is mimetic 
desire not also in a certain sense, like the will according to Schopenhauer, 
“free of all forms of that in which it clothes itself’? Mimetic desire can have 
all sorts of models and objects, but these models and objects do not in any 
way determine the essence, the ‘an sich\ of desire.
However, it is not sufficient to call desire mimetic and to presume an 
implicit alliance between all those who defend a mimetic theory of desire 
and Jung. According to Borch-Jacobsen and Roustang, the problem of 
mimesis as it were casts a shadow over the entire correspondence between 
Jung and Freud.17 In particular, they point out that this correspondence itself 
must be read in terms of mimetic desire. Thus Freud very early proposes to 
Jung an “intellectual communism” in which there is no tight control over 
what one gives and what one has received.18 In other words, Freud proposes 
that Jung speculate together with him in such a way that each partner has the 
right, without scruple -  that is to say, without concerning himself with the 
right to a ‘certificate of origin’ -  to make the thoughts of the other his own. 
But if each of the two parties involved may -  must -  make the other’s 
thoughts his own, then that other also continually threatens to appear as a 
sort of ‘doppelganger’. In such a relation, it can not be otherwise since each 
must appear to the other as a sort of usurper who has appropriated for 
himself ‘my’ ideas: from there, for example, there follow claims for one’s 
own originality, accusations of ill will and misunderstanding that will lead
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ultimately to a break between Freud and Jung.|y ‘Intellectual communism’ 
leads, in other words, according to an inexorable logic -  the logic of the 
mimetic relation -  to its contrary: the confirmation of one’s own identity, the 
consolidation of the proper and inalienable ego, the affirmation of the self. 
The fact that T  have my identity and ownness in the other, that T  am not 
myself, is as unspeakable as it is unacceptable. This is the classic scheme of 
mimesis: similarity leads to (affirmation of) difference, and mimesis to a 
claim for ownness and originality.20 Or, as Girard would say, the affirmation 
of ownness and originality is nothing but the centrifugal movement of an ego 
that is not capable of desiring by itself, that cannot bypass a fatal mediation 
by a model.21
This problematic of self-assertion, o f the affirmation of the self -  and thus 
of narcissism? -  that follows mimesis like a shadow seems to lead directly 
into that of psychosis. Or at least, into the problematic of paranoia -the 
■narcissistic disturbance par excellence which in a certain sense functions as 
Freud’s paradigm for psychosis in general. For does it not indeed appear that 
the theoreticians of mimesis -  whether explicitly or not -  invite us to 
consider paranoia, alongside Jung (and, at bottom, Bleuler), as an excessive 
“affirmation of an abased and disillusioned self’?22 In any case, there thus 
seems good reason to ask ourselves what they might have to say to us 
concerning this disturbance. In doing so, we will take as our guide the 
analysis of the correspondence between Freud and Jung which we find in the 
work of Borch-Jacobsen and Roustang.
«
3. Jung and Freud on Paranoia
3.1 General Exposition
Your views on paranoia have not lain fallow. I have been able to confirm them many times 
over... The detachment of the libido, its regression to autoerotic forms, is probably well 
explained by the self-assertion, the psychological self-preservation of the individual. 
Hysteria keeps to the plane of ‘preservation of the species’, paranoia (Dementia praecox) to 
the plane of self-preservation, i.e., autoerotism2i (Letter 12}).
This fragment from a letter that Jung sent to Freud on February 20, 1908, 
is of interest in many respects. Jung refers, as is clear, to his own views on 
psychosis in general and paranoia in particular. Psychosis is an answer to 
vital situations of disenchantment, humiliation, the impossibility of realizing 
a specific aim, etc. These real conflicts are, according to Jung, overcompen­
sated in the world of fantasy: a fantasmatic -  and in Jung’s terminology this 
means an ‘auto-erotic’ -  solution is posed for real problems. In light of this, 
the withdrawal of libido from objects o f the outer world must be understood 
in terms of the ‘psychological self-preservation of the individual.’ Thus 
paranoia is an excessive self-affirmation in response to, for example, a 
situation in which the ego considers itself injured or abased.24
Still, our citation is interesting not only for the information that it conveys
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regarding Jung’s own insights on psychosis, but also for its stylistic charac­
teristics. While referring to his own theory, Jung gives the impression -  one 
might say that ‘he acts as i f  -  that it is one with that of Freud: “Your 
(Freud’s) views on paranoia have not lain fallow. I have been able to confirm 
them many times over...” The mimetic contract exhibits its productivity: I, 
Jung, am hard at work confirming your (Freud’s) metapsychology, we 
occupy the same standpoint and the same theoretical perspective. But at the 
very moment that Jung confirms his identity with Freud he also brutally 
introduces a difference: “Hysteria keeps to the plane of ‘preservation of the 
species’, paranoia (Dementia praecox) to the plane of self-preservation, i.e., 
autoerotism.” Jung can not but have known that to Freud’s ears this 
statement would sound like a provocation. In Freud’s famous “Anlehnungs- 
theorie” (theory of ‘leaning on’)25 of sexuality, auto-erotism denotes the 
moment in which the sexual drive frees itself from the drive for self-preser­
vation in order to find satisfaction autonomously in one’s own body. 
According to Freud the satisfaction of the sexual drive originally leans on the 
satisfaction of the self-preservation-drive: erotic pleasure is concomitant 
with the child’s feeding and in a way that makes it impossible to discern this 
pleasure from the pleasure that goes together with the satisfaction of bodily 
functions as such.26 This pleasure, in a second moment, is sought for its own 
sake (and independently from any biological need) in one’s own body, that is 
auto-erotically. Thus for Freud the notion of auto-eroticism clearly refers to 
the sexual drive. It has nothing to do with self-preservation. Once again, 
Borch-Jacob sen notes, the fulfillment of the mimetic contract leads to the 
confirmation of owness and thus to the breaking of the contract: logique 
mimetique oblige...27
Things are no different for Freud. In a letter to Jung in 1907, he writes 
that psychosis is characterized by a withdrawal of the libido from the outer 
world. The libidinous energy thus free is then invested in the ego, that is to 
say, Freud adds, that the libido has become auto-erotic again. When this 
return succeeds, what results is dementia praecox (autism, schizophrenia), 
but when it does not succeed, then a portion of the libido is reinvested in the 
object which became hostile in the process. This hostility is, according to 
Freud, the ‘endogenous perception’ of the original disinvestment of the 
object.28
Beginning in 1910 -  in other words, from his study on ‘Senate President 
Schreber’ onwards -  Freud introduces the distinction we have already 
mentioned between auto-erotism and narcissism. This distinction was still 
lacking from the letter we just referred to. What else can this mean, asks 
Borch-Jacobsen, than that Freud has come progressively to the standpoint of 
Jung, at least with regard to the distinction between auto-erotism and megalo­
mania?29 Does not the introduction of narcissism mean that Freud realized in
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the mean-time that megalomania can not be conceived in terms of auto­
erotism? Freud’s theory of narcissism then implies a turn in Jung’s direction 
toward a study and analysis of the ego which Freud, on his own admission, 
had neglected. But at the moment that Freud seems to turn toward Jung, he 
also affirms their difference: I (Freud) am in agreement with you (Jung) that a 
better conception of psychosis is possible only through the development of an 
ego-psychology, but I immediately add that this ego itself can and may be 
understood only as a libidinous construct. The excessive self-affirmation of 
the paranoiac is, according to Freud, of libidinous, that is sexual, nature.311
The respective positions of Jung (and the proponents of the theory of 
mimesis) and Freud in the debate which occupies us here are thus clear: self- 
affirmation out of self-preservation versus ‘sexual’ overestimation of the 
self. One nevertheless sees the problem: what do we mean when we refer to 
this self-overestimation as £sexual’, and also, what in fact are we saying 
when we propose that self-preservation has nothing to do with Freud’s 
‘libido sexual is’? Freudians will certainly remark ~ not, after all, without 
reason -  that this entire discussion has little meaning unless we first ask 
ourselves precisely what it is that Freud understands by sexuality. It must at 
least be clear that when Freud calls narcissism ‘libidinous’ and thus ‘sexual’, 
he is not thinking of adult genital sexuality. Still, perhaps we should ask 
ourselves not only in what manner Freud extends the concept of sexuality 
but also, and much more importantly, why he does so. Indeed, that extension 
is not to be considered apart from Freud’s project as a whole. What Freud 
tries to think -  because he thinks that his clinical practice requires him to do 
so -  is the mutual and constitutive penetration of the sexual and the psychic. 
This constitutive entanglement can be thematized only when sexuality is not 
restricted solely to genital or even infantile sexuality. In fact, we are thus 
dealing with a double extension: on the one hand, sexuality can no longer be 
equated with the domain of genital sexuality, but on the other hand, and 
moreover, the dispositive thus reached is not, on the grounds of the consti­
tutive entanglement of the sexual and the psychic, to be approached as 
merely behavioral. For Freud, sexuality is something more and something 
other than the sum of the forms of behavior emerging from a specific sort of 
appetite. The latter underscores once again the importance of the discussion 
on  narcissism: by thinking the ego itself as a libidinous construct, Freud 
emphasizes the mutual and necessary implication of the psychic and the 
sexual. Precisely what this means or can mean for Freud will not occupy us 
here, though indeed it already has the appearance of an essential aspect of 
Freudian psychoanalysis that neither the theoreticians of mimesis nor Jung 
himself could or would accept -  if they have not, in fact, simply overlooked 
it. Perhaps further analysis of the Freud-Jung debate from the perspective of 
the problematic of mimesis can provide more clarity.
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3,2 Senate President Schreber'1
In 1907, Freud connected psychosis with a withdrawal of the libido, from 
the objects of the outer world. In his famous study of “Senate President 
Schreber” (1911), he specifies that it is a matter of a homosexual object.32 
Schreber’s illness, as is well-known, erupted on the occasion of his 
appointment as chairman of the court of appeals in Dresden. Grosso modo} it 
passed through two phases: in the first phase, Schreber was the victim of 
terrible homosexual attacks by Flechsig, his former physician, who was then 
quickly succeeded by God himself; in a second phase, he accepted his fate 
and organized his delusion into a complicated and strongly religiously 
inspired cosmogony in terms of which he saw himself as the female savior of 
the world who must give rise to a new and superior human race on earth. The 
analysis of this tragic case history led Freud to interpret different sorts of 
delusion (erotomania, delusions of persecution and jealousy, and megalo­
mania) as different ways of denying the proposition 1 (a man) love him’. The 
megalomaniac reworks the entire proposition: ‘1 love nothing and no one, I 
love only m yself. In this way, says Freud, he regresses to infantile 
narcissism, in which the ego loved only itself and objects of die outer world 
played no psychical role.33 And infantile narcissism, he goes on, opens 
immediately onto a stage of homosexual object-choice in which only objects 
with the same sexual characteristics are chosen.34 Originally, the libido invests 
only objects similar to me. The paranoid patient would, as it were, pass 
through this evolution in the reverse direction. When he turns away from the 
homosexual object, there remains no other way out for him than to turn back 
to the narcissistic, that is to say an-objectal, stage. From this, megalomania 
and its characteristic ‘Weltuntergangserlebnis’ is the result. When this 
regressive movement fails, the libido turns back along the same (homosexual) 
path back to the world of objects, which gives rise to the formation of other 
types of delusions as so many denials of the homosexual point of departure.
The future will tell -  so concludes Freud’s analysis of the Schreber case -  
whether our theory contains more madness than I would like or madness 
more truth than I can see today.35 That theory connects the eruption of 
psychosis with a homosexual impulse, Schreber himself, however, was of 
another conviction: he attributed the outbreak of psychosis to a plot by 
Flechsig to prevent him from becoming a ‘nerve specialist’... like Flechsig 
• himself. In other words, Schreber attributed his sickness to a ‘non-sexual 
complex concerning the profession1 (Jung). Or again, Schreber himself 
ascribes his sorry fate to a problem of professional, i.e., mimetic, rivalry.36
Freud, it is true, did not deny that one can become sick from one’s 
profession (frustrated ambition, etc.), but he immediately added that this is 
possible only on the basis of a more fundamental, unconscious conflict in 
which homosexuality regularly plays a role. Freud writes:
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Paranoia is precisely a disorder in which a sexual aetiology is by no means obvious; far from 
this, the strikingly prominent features in the causation of paranoia, especially among males, 
are social humiliations and slights. But if we go into the matter a little more deeply, we shall 
be able to see that the really operative factor in these social injuries lies in the part played in 
them by the homosexual components of emotional life. So long as the individual is 
functioning normally and it is consequently impossible to see into the depths of his mental 
life, we may doubt whether his emotional relations to his neighbors in socicty have anything 
to do with sexuality, either actually or in their genesis. But delusions never fail to uncover 
these relations and to trace back the social feelings to their roots in a directly erotic wish . '7
The paranoid delusion thus finds its origin in a field -  that of social 
relations -  of which the sexual character is not self-evident. And, further, not 
just any homosexuality gives rise to paranoid conflict: indeed, it concerns a 
conflict in the area of sublimated, “ziel-gehemmte” (thrust-inhibited) 
homosexuality.
We already know that the first object-choice, that is to say the original 
relation to the other is, according to Freud, homosexual in nature. Homosex­
uality is in this sense the original social drive. In this first stage of object- 
choice, only objects with the same sexual characteristics are chosen. The first 
object is in the strictest sense an alter-ego. Here the other can be an object of 
libidinous investment only on the ground of his similarity to me.
Nevertheless, this original social drive can also become social in the strict 
sense of the word by combining itself with the self-preservation-instincts or, 
as Freud calls them from 1910 onwards, with the ego-instincts (Ich-Triebe). 
This makes possible a sublimation of the homosexual drive through which 
sociality proper can then emerge. Homosexuality is thus the energy of 
sociality. For precisely this reason, says Freud, they menace social relations 
from the inside out, as their ‘inner exteriority’. Homosexuality is the energy 
of the social: it is that which transforms the ego-instinct into a social drive. 
At the same time, it is also a permanent threat to the social : when the 
homosexual impulse which provides it with its energy becomes too strong, it 
threatens to collapse the entire social edifice. This, according to Freud, is 
what happens in paranoia. Paranoid patients defend themselves against 
“einer solchen Sexualisierung ihrer sozialen Triebbesetzungen” (such a
sexualization of their social drive-in vestment). Paranoia is a sickness of 
sublimation,111
The homosexual object-choice, we know, is the most original. The other 
is beloved because he is an alter-ego. This homosexual object-choice is thus 
essentially narcissistic. The object is chosen because of its similarity to me. 
For the proponents of mimesis, this seems just what they were waiting for. 
And this is all the more so since the transition from this archi-sociality to 
sociality in the strict sense seems in this case to bring little change to light: 
just as homosexuality is essentially narcissistic, so sociality seems to be 
intrinsically linked up with homosexuality. This, according to Borch-
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Jacobsen, explains why the homosexual drive is so easily tied to the ego- 
instinct: in homosexuality the ego is already interested in itself. It is thus the 
similarity which creates a tie (the /zorno-sexuality) and not the sexual libido 
(homo-sexuality). Consequently, there is no essential distinction between 
ego-instinct and libido: desire, we are to believe, is solely mimetic.39
The implications of this mimetic reinterpretation of Freud are consid­
erable. Freud introduces an original homo-sexual stage in the development of 
the libido in order to account for certain phenomena (e.g. ‘mimetic rivalry’) 
that seem to be characteristic of paranoia.40 By thus inferring normality 
(homosexual ‘archi-sociality’) from pathology, Freud would write, as it 
were, pathology into the heart of normality. When this original homosexual 
openness to the other is reinterpreted in terms of mimesis, it implies an 
equiprimordial openness to the annihilation by the other. Indeed, when the 
other is in the strictest sense an alter-ego, then he is also and for the same 
reason a stranger and an enemy. He deprives me of myself (my authenticity). 
The other acts, as it were, ‘in my place’ without me having any control over 
him. Not so much my objects as my identity and properness would be at 
stake -  or better, they are from this perspective always already lost. As a 
consequence, there is a violence inherent to the appearing of the other as 
such. This violence belongs to the very essence of a desire that seeks or 
wants to be itself but can only find that ownness in the other. In this light, 
narcissism is nothing other than the confirmation of the ego, that is to say of 
the desire to cancel the original displacement in the other that I myself am. 
Mimetic desire is -  as mimetic -  immediately narcissistic: it has always 
already forgotten its (mimetic) origin.
Can there still be any wonder, chorus Roustang and Borch-Jacob sen, that 
Freud discovers madness at the heart of social relations? According to Freud, 
the delusion (‘He hates me’) supplants the proposition T love him’ which is 
projected outside in reverse form. In the light of a mimetic theory of desire 
and of sociality, what returns from the outside in this manner is not 
something that is ‘first’ projected to the outside by and already constituted 
subject, but that ‘same’ subject showing itself to itself from the outside, in 
the inner dissension inevitably caused by mimetic doubling. However much 
the subject tries to be absolutely ‘itself’, it is that much more confronted with 
itself in the figure of an enemy doppelganger. To acknowledge that I am an 
other, that to and in the heart of my desire I am like an other, comes down to 
an acknowledgement of the unspeakable -  namely, that I am not myself and 
that my identity lies in the other. This is, according to Borch-Jacobsen, the 
truth that the paranoiac ‘represses’ in delusion. Paranoia is indeed a narcis­
sistic disturbance, but narcissism is nothing other than the -  potentially 
overblown -  ‘affirmation of the uniqueness of the ego.’ Seventy years after 
the facts, Jung wins out against Freud.
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4. Conclusion
But does this really refute Freud? In the first place, one could (and should) 
ask the proponents of mimesis whether they are also able to make intelligible 
the other psychical disturbances -  or even psychosis itself. What does seem 
tempting to the philosopher should also be plausible from a more clinical 
standpoint. For the moment at least, it is far from clear how this theory of 
mimesis can help to explain obsessional neurosis in all its aspects, let alone 
schizophrenia. And one is certainly to expect this to result from what 
unequivocally understands itself as a ‘general theory’. Above all, and still in 
the same line, one can ask oneself whether interpreting Freudian desire 
solely and exclusively as homo-sexual desire, and thus in terms of mimesis, 
does justice to the subtle distinctions that Freud introduces in the domain of 
identification. Mimetic identification is a ‘total identification’ in which the 
ego is radically transformed in conformity with the model with which it 
identifies itself. It is, in Freudian terms a ‘narcissistic1 identification. The 
question must be asked whether the theorists of mimesis by so easily 
reducing identification to ‘narcissistic identification5 do not bypass the 
multiformity and complexity of clinical reality in which very different types 
of identification may have to be distinguished. Furthermore, when Borch- 
Jacobsen, with regard to Freud’s study on Schreber, writes that the 
homosexual drive can easily be tied up with the ego-instinct because in 
homosexuality the ego is already interested in itself, one wonders whether he 
is not pulling a rabbit out of his hat, after having put it there himself. Indeed, 
the Freudian concept of an ego-instinct refers first and foremost to biological 
self-preservation. The ego-instinct has, according to Freud, its source in the 
ego and is directed towards objects that are independent of it, e.g. food.41 
This ego-instinct has little or nothing to do with the metaphysical desire for 
identity Borch-Jacobsen is thinking of. This would be much more the case 
for the ego-libido (narcissistic libido), the concept of which Freud did not 
introduce for another four years.
There remains, however, the problem of whether or not the character of 
the libido is sexual. Or better, it can still be asked whether Freud’s theory of 
the libido can render an account of the psychotic break with reality. It will 
come as no surprise that I will not -  and can not -  give a definitive answer to 
this question. But we can ask ourselves whether Freud’s opponents have in 
fact met him on his own ground. Is not this entire discussion founded on a 
misunderstanding?
We have already noted that the Freudian extension of the concept of the 
libido makes it impossible to define it from a purely behavioral point of 
view: sexuality is for Freud something more and something other than the 
sum of forms of behavior anticipating a specific sort of corporal satisfaction. 
In a sense, Jung had little trouble with an extended concept of the libido -
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that is, if one were to restrict it to the behavioral. For example, when Freud, 
during the early years of his correspondence with Jung, related dementia 
praecox to a regression to auto-erotism, Jung hastened to provide him with 
all sorts of clinical data on genital and pre-genital behavior testifying to that 
regression. But he immediately added that as far as he could see mastur­
bation and the manipulation of excrement did not concur with anything 
psychical.42 Thus does Jung write in a letter to Freud in 1907 that sexuality in 
sensu stricto has altogether no effect on the psyche, that in the majority of 
cases it is experienced as something strange and inopportune and that it 
provides no occasion for repression. Elsewhere, he writes that the giving up 
of sexual interest can not explain the psychotic break with reality. The 
withdrawal of libido sexualis might yield an ascetic \ recluse who has 
banished all traces of sexuality from himself, but it does not produce 
schizophrenia. And Jung adds in a note: even when, in order to clarify, one 
adds to the withdrawal of sexual libido a regression to an infantile stage, one 
is still not free of problems. In any case, it can not be demonstrated that it is 
always sexuality that is stricken by regression: “Ich kenne Fälle von 
Dementia Praecox, wo alle Selbsterhaltungsrücksichten wegfallen, nicht aber 
die sehr lebhaften erotischen Interesse.”41 One is again left with the 
impression that Jung seems to reduce sexuality to a form of behavior. In 
other words, what Jung from the beginning can not or will not except is the 
mutual and constitutive penetration of the sexual and the psychical. He can 
not or does not want to see that Freud is not so much talking of sexuality, but 
of psycho-sexuality.
The Freudian libido does indeed seem to escape the Jungian dilemma 
(sexual libido vs. psychical interest). According to Freud, sexuality can not 
be reduced to the pursuit of satisfaction which would be more or less directly 
related to a release of tension on the level of the various erogenous zones. 
From a genetic point of view, there can be no doubt that sexuality is to be 
brought together with such a release of tension. However, according to 
Freud, this scheme is greatly complicated by psychical development. 
Everything that can indirectly represent an erotic object can in turn become 
the object of libidinous investment. Or, again, anything capable, even 
indirectly, of representing the erotic object can mobilize the libido. The 
sexual drive emerges out of the perception of a multitude of metonymic and 
metaphoric representatives of the desired object. This is, for Freud, its 
essential characteristic. These re-presentatives are nonetheless sometimes 
quite different from erotic objects in the strict sense of the word, which can 
bring about a real physiological-sexual release and satisfaction. The 
libidinous investment of these re-presentatives can therefore find satisfaction 
solely in, for example, cognitive or aesthetic acts. Despite the multiformity 
of its fate, the sexual character of the libido can, according to Freud, be
15
maintained since sexuality is something else than the reality of erotic 
behavior and can certainly not be reduced to the relation between a drive for 
procreation and the mediating objects through which this aim can be 
accomplished. This explains why the argument pointing to the ascetic lacks 
any power of persuasion over Freud. Worse even, it begs the question: “Er 
mag sein sexuelles Interesse von den Menschen gänzlich abgewendet und 
kann es doch zum gesteigerten Interesse für Göttliches, Natürliches ... 
sublimiert haben, ohne eine Introversion seiner Libido auf seine Phantasien 
oder einer Rückkehr derselben zu seinem Ich verfallen zu sein.”44
What bearing does this have on the proponents of mimesis? According to 
the adherents of that theory, desire is specified through the mimetic assimi­
lation of a model, and there is no certainty whatsoever that it will always and 
by definition concern a sexual model. Consequently, they would have us 
believe that Freud without proper justification sexualizes desire. But it seems 
quite evident that ‘sexual model’ is here to be understood according to the 
strict sense of that word -  that is to say, such that that model in one or 
another manner exhibits recognizably sexual activity. From the perspective 
of mimesis it is ruled out in advance that an ascetic, for example, would 
appear as a ‘sexual model’. Once one tries to think desire exclusively from 
out of mimesis, one is without any further possibility of connecting non- 
overtly sexual behavior with sexuality. One might concede that ‘infantile 
sexual activity’ does exist, and one can then separate it from pure genitality, 
but one can not do otherwise than think sexuality from and as sexual 
behavior. At least implicitly -  and mutatis mutandis -  we find here again the 
same impossibility -  or should we say unwillingness? -  to think the mutual 
penetration of the sexual and the psychical. Just as was the case with Jung, 
the proponents of mimesis can not or do not want to think the Freudian 
problematic of psycho-sexuality. Freud could also say of the mimetic theory 
of desire that “it begs the question.”
After an interval of 70 years, the debate between Freud and Jung thus 
repeats itself After an interval of 70 years, the same misunderstanding is 
also repeated. The question here is not so much whether Freud and not, for 
example, Jung is right; for in order to answer that question one will first have 
to clearly define the subject of that debate. Perhaps we will then realize that 
the Freud-Jung debate has yet to begin.
K.U. Nijmegen
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